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Why do some states
engage in ethnic cleansing or genocide during wars whereas others do not?1
This question is important for both practical and theoretical reasons. From a
practical perspective, mass ethnic violence continues to shape the demography
and politics of large geographical regions of the world. Recent examples in-
clude events in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo in the 1990s as well as Sudan,
Iraq, and Syria in the 2000s. These cases indicate that understanding the causes
of mass ethnic violence remains as relevant today as it was at the beginning of
the twentieth century.
From a theoretical perspective, the literature on mass ethnic violence in
wartime leaves critical issues unresolved. Existing studies suggest that a com-
bination of strategic factors, such as the existence of a multifront war and war-
time minority collaboration with enemy forces, pushes state leaders to pursue
mass ethnic violence.2 These works improve on earlier studies in substantial
ways, but they treat the ideological and institutional structure of state leader-
ship during wars as theoretically irrelevant.3 As a result, they have difªculty
H. Zeynep Bulutgil is an assistant professor of comparative politics in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy at Tufts University.
The author wishes to thank Daniel Drezner, Nancy Hite-Rubin, Jette Steen Knudsen, and the anon-
ymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Throughout the article, the term “ethnic cleansing” refers to deportations or killings that victim-
ize a substantial segment of an ethnic group on a state’s territory. According to this deªnition,
“genocide” is a subcategory of ethnic cleansing in which the victimization primarily takes the
form of killings rather than deportations. I use the terms “ethnic cleansing” and “mass ethnic vio-
lence” interchangeably throughout the article. For more detail on the conceptual deªnition of “eth-
nic cleansing,” see H. Zeynep Bulutgil, “Social Cleavages, Wartime Experience, and Ethnic
Cleansing in Europe,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 52, No. 5 (September 2015), pp. 577–590.
2. Alexander B. Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victim-
ization in War,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 152–195; Alexander B.
Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008); Benjamin A.
Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killings and Genocide in the 20th Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2004); and Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “‘Draining the
Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare,” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2004),
pp. 375–407.
3. Unlike earlier literature that emphasized the role of interethnic animosity, these studies provide
a potential explanation for the timing of mass ethnic violence. In addition, their insights are consis-
tent with micro-level studies that suggest that interethnic animosity does not necessarily precede
large-scale ethnic violence. See, for example, Scott A. Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and
War in Rwanda (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the
Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1995).
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explaining why state leaders faced with multifront wars and minority collabo-
ration often pursue different policies.4
This article seeks to bring domestic politics back into the study of mass eth-
nic violence.5 It makes two main theoretical claims. First, state leaders can vary
along two dimensions in wartime.6 The ªrst dimension involves the extent to
which they prioritize keeping or expanding territory over other political goals.
Variation along this dimension inºuences the degree to which state leaders are
willing to invest more resources in the war, as opposed to making territorial
concessions and pulling out of the conºict. The second dimension involves
those who prioritize territorial goals but vary in the extent to which they think
that ethnic cleansing is the best means of achieving them. This dimension re-
ºects the fact that in wartime there is often conºicting information about
whether a state’s ethnic minorities are collaborating with an enemy state and
about whether such collaboration hinders territorial goals.
The article’s second theoretical claim is that ethnic cleansing is less likely if
the state leadership includes inºuential political groups that prioritize non-
ethnic political cleavages such as social-class or clerical-anticlerical (religious-
secular) divisions over ethnic ones.7 Political parties or factions that are
primarily focused on achieving domestic political objectives, such as economic
redistribution or protection of the role of the church, may be more inclined to
make territorial concessions to end wars. Moreover, given their ideological pri-
orities, the leaders from these political parties or factions are less likely to
view the world as divided into competing ethnic groups. Hence, compared
to nationalist leaders, these individuals are less likely to ignore evidence that
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4. This article focuses on cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide that occur during wartime. Both
phenomena, however, can also take place immediately after a war ends or in peacetime. For a con-
sideration of such cases, see Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Re-
sentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and
H. Zeynep Bulutgil, The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Europe (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2016).
5. For other recent works that examine the role of domestic politics in the study of genocide, see
Scott A. Straus, “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Re-
straint,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2012), pp. 343–362; and Scott A. Straus, Making
and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2015).
6. For the rest of the article, leadership of states includes not only individuals and organizations
that are in government, but also individuals and organizations, such as members of robust opposi-
tion parties, with the potential to inºuence government policy.
7. For a classical text on the sources of ethnic and non-ethnic social cleavages in Europe, see Sey-
mour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Align-
ments,” in Peter Mair, ed., The West European Party System (1967; repr. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), pp. 91–138. Both the existence of groups based on non-ethnic cleavages and the exis-
tence of institutional mechanisms that allow these groups to inºuence decisionmaking are impor-
tant for this argument. As the empirical sections of this article show, such institutional
mechanisms could exist even in the absence of a democratic regime.
calls into question the existence or strategic relevance of minority collaboration
and more likely to consider alternatives to ethnic cleansing in wartime.
The article evaluates these two claims through controlled comparisons
of three minority-state dyads during World War I: the Italians in Austria,
the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, and the Muslims in the Russian South
Caucasus.8 These cases were selected according to three criteria. First, they al-
low the analysis to control for the wartime security challenges that, according
to the existing literature, result in mass ethnic violence. The states in question
were ªghting on multiple fronts; the minorities involved had already been
linked to a territorial conºict with a neighboring state during peacetime; and
some members of these minorities collaborated with the neighboring state
during the war. Second, the analysis controls for regional and period-related
conditions by focusing on the policies of three multinational empires in
Central and Eastern Europe during the same war. Third, the wartime policies
of the three states vis-à-vis the minority groups identiªed above differed. In
Austria, the leadership pursued a temporary policy of limited deportations
that targeted Italians living close to the front lines. In the Ottoman case, the
government subjected the Armenians in Eastern and Central Anatolia to mass
deportations and killings, leading to genocide. In the Russian case, the military
engaged in targeted massacres of Muslim populations in the South Caucasus;
and although the government initially decided to pursue the wholesale depor-
tation of these populations, it reversed this policy in its early stages.
The argument presented in this article offers an explanation for the diver-
gent policies in these three cases. In the Austrian case, the political parties
based on social class and clerical-anticlerical divisions were the strongest dur-
ing the prewar period. To a lesser extent, political parties that prioritized non-
ethnic cleavages also played a noteworthy role in Russian politics. During
World War I, the political groups that emphasized non-ethnic cleavages con-
tinued to be dominant or inºuential in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian
Empires. In contrast, in the Ottoman Empire the radical nationalists within the
ruling party had largely paciªed the opposition both inside and outside
the government by 1914. In the Austrian and Russian cases, the governments
did not pursue larger numbers of deportations and killings given the promi-
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8. On the importance of controlled comparisons for scholars who seek to understand national-
level variation in political outcomes, see Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Enduring Indispens-
ability of the Controlled Comparison,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 10 (October 2013),
pp. 1301–1327; and Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Prac-
tice,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (February 2010), pp. 230–259. For a discussion of
the need for controlled comparisons in the study of genocide in particular, see Straus, Making and
Unmaking Nations.
nence or direct intervention of political leaders who had focused their atten-
tion on non-ethnic issues before the war. In contrast, in the Ottoman case,
where such actors were comparatively weak to begin with and completely op-
pressed by 1914, the government pursued a genocidal policy.
This comparative historical analysis has implications for understanding the
dynamics of mass ethnic violence in the contemporary period. The argument
presented here is applicable to situations that meet two conditions: ªrst, there
is an ongoing international or civil war in which the sides are close to symmet-
rically matched in military terms; second, within the territory controlled by at
least one of the sides, there is an ethnic group whose members are collaborat-
ing militarily with the other side. These types of situations are currently
unfolding or have recently occurred in a variety contexts, including in sub-
Saharan Africa and post-communist Europe, which I discuss in the conclusion.
The article is divided into ªve main sections. The ªrst section summarizes
and critiques the theoretical argument that states’ wartime security concerns
result in ethnic cleansing. The second section outlines how salient non-ethnic
cleavages affect state leaders’ wartime decisions that relate to minorities. The
third section tests the argument by comparing the Austrian, Ottoman, and
Russian cases. The fourth section discusses the extent to which alternative
arguments may account for the differences across these cases. The conclusion
offers a summary of the article’s main ªndings.
War, Territory, and Ethnic Cleansing: A Theoretical Critique
Theoretical approaches that link wartime security considerations to large-
scale violence against ethnic minorities are rooted in two literatures. The ªrst
approach, based on the work of Myron Weiner, examines the impact on inter-
national conºict of ethnic groups that span borders, especially when these
groups constitute the politically dominant majority in one state and the politi-
cally weak minority in the other.9 Weiner argues that this type of situation can
lead to border problems between states and result in acute ethnic conºict
within them.10
Several scholars have reªned Weiner’s argument. Most prominently, Rogers
Brubaker has proposed a model of “triadic conªguration,” comprising a na-
tionalizing state, a minority, and a “homeland.”11 He argues that homelands
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9. Myron Weiner, “The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations
and Political Development,” World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (July 1971), pp. 665–683.
10. Ibid.
11. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe
tend to show interest in the fate of their “co-ethnics” across the border, which
often creates interstate conºict. Others have also provided theoretical and em-
pirical support for the argument that ethnic groups that cross borders might
increase the chances of war under certain conditions.12
Scholars who work on mass violence have tied this literature to ethnic
cleansing in two ways. First, if the homeland tries to annex the territory that
includes its co-ethnics, the state under attack begins to regard that ethnic
group as a ªfth column, based on its actual or anticipated collaboration with
the group’s homeland.13 Second, from the perspective of the target state, the
annexationist war raises the possibility that the very existence of the ethnic kin
group increases the chances of its adversary making territorial demands in the
future.14 Thus, states engage in ethnic cleansing against the ethnic kin of en-
emy states during wartime to avoid losing territory and to decrease the likeli-
hood of future territorial demands.
The second literature relevant for linking security considerations to mass
ethnic violence is that on civil wars and military occupations.15 Here, the argu-
ment is that if the stronger party to the conºict—the occupying state or the
government—is able to extract information from the civilian population and
identify resistance organizers, it will seek to selectively kill these individuals.
If the stronger side is unable to gather the information required to ªnd these
organizers, it will tend to target large groups, such as entire ethnicities.
Building on these insights, existing studies identify two characteristics of in-
ternational wars that make the ªghting parties likely to use mass ethnic vio-
lence instead of selectively targeting individuals within ethnic minorities.
First, the ªghting sides in international wars tend to be more symmetrically
matched than those in civil wars.16 Second, in international wars states are typ-
ically engaged on multiple fronts. Both of these factors shorten the state lead-
ers’ time horizon to win wars, and hence make them less likely to spend the
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The “homeland” refers to a neighboring country
in which the minority constitutes the majority ethnic group.
12. Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War: Nationalism and Ethnic Politics in the Modern World (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, For
Kin and Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
13. Valentino, Final Solutions; Downes, Targeting Civilians in War; and Downes, “Desperate Times,
Desperate Measures.”
14. Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures.”
15. See, for example, Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea”; and Reed M.
Wood, Jacob D. Kathman, and Stephen E. Gent, “Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in
Intrastate Conºicts,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49, No. 5 (September 2012), pp. 647–660.
16. Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures”; and Harris Mylonas, The Politics of Nation-
Building: The Making of Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
time and resources needed to selectively target individuals who collaborate
with the enemy.
Arguments that identify wartime security concerns as the main cause of
mass ethnic violence rely on two implicit and, as I demonstrate below, empiri-
cally questionable assumptions. The ªrst assumption is that leaders who dom-
inate the state apparatus uniformly prioritize keeping or acquiring territory
over other political goals. A careful reading of the history, however, reveals the
existence of leaders who had other priorities, even in wartime. The most obvi-
ous examples are the socialist parties across Europe and their attitude toward
World War I.17 Although these parties failed to prevent World War I, their
members continued to be the main champions of antiwar sentiment for the du-
ration of the war.18 Serbian and Russian socialists were persistently opposed to
the war from the beginning.19 Other organizations, such as trade unions and
socialist parties in Germany, France, and Austria, engaged in anti-war activi-
ties once the costs of prolonged war became clear in 1915.20 In perhaps the
best-known instance of withdrawing from a war to pursue revolution, in 1918
the Bolsheviks in Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which, among
other things, resulted in extensive Russian territorial losses.21
These examples do not necessarily suggest that political organizations that
prioritize nonterritorial goals are historically ubiquitous. Rather, they suggest
that instead of treating state leaderships as ideologically uniform, scholars
should model them as continuums that run from factions that would incur any
cost to achieve their territorial goals to those that would give up territory to
achieve other political goals within the remaining territory.22 The more that a
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17. The ºexibility of left-wing parties in territorial matters compared to that of right-wing parties
was not conªned to Europe during World War I. For a more recent example, see Reuven Y. Hazan,
“Intraparty Politics and Peacemaking in Democratic Societies: Israel’s Labor Party and the Middle
East Peace Process, 1992–96,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May 2000), pp. 363–378; and
Efraim Inbar and Giora Goldberg, “Is Israel’s Political Élite Becoming More Hawkish?” Interna-
tional Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 631–660.
18. John Horne, “Labor and Labor Movements in World War I,” in Jay Winter, Geoffrey Parker,
and Mary R. Habeck, eds., The Great War and the Twentieth Century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2000), pp. 187–227; and Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century
(London: Abacus, 1995). Kenneth N. Waltz also famously invoked this case as evidence that inter-
national factors are more important than transnational ideologies. See Waltz, Man, the State, and
War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
19. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 59.
20. Horne, “Labor and Labor Movements in World War I”; and Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes,
pp. 58, 59.
21. On the relative importance of revolutionary ideology and military expediency for Bolshevik
foreign policy during 1917–18, see Richard Gregor, “Lenin, Revolution, and Foreign Policy,” Inter-
national Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Autumn 1967), pp. 563–575; and Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great
War, America, and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931 (New York: Viking, 2014).
22. The idea that domestic political organizations vary in their foreign policy preferences is not
new. It is, for example, at the core of Robert D. Putnam’s well-known analysis of diplomacy
state’s political organizations resemble the second faction, the more reluctant
the leadership will be to invest in any policy, including ethnic cleansing, de-
signed to boost the war effort.
The second implicit assumption is that state leaders who prioritize keeping
or gaining territory uniformly agree that using mass violence against ethnic
groups is the best way to achieve either or both of these goals. This assumption
is questionable for two reasons. First, wholesale deportations of ethnic groups
typically include individuals who cannot inºuence battleªeld outcomes, in-
cluding those who reside far away from war zones and other noncombatants.
Second, the state leaderships may be uncertain about whether the members of
ethnic groups that serve in the armies of enemy states or form auxiliary mili-
tias have a noteworthy impact on the outcome of battles. Anecdotal historical
evidence suggests that they do not typically play a crucial role on the bat-
tleªeld.23 Additionally, relevant studies do not ªnd clear evidence that the vic-
timization of civilians, including in ethnic cleansing campaigns, increases the
likelihood of winning wars.24
If mass ethnic violence was the only way for a state to reach its territorial
goals, then state leaders who prioritize such goals would agree on this policy
despite their uncertainty about its contribution to the war effort. Large-scale
deportations and killings of ethnic minorities, however, are not the only way
to achieve territorial goals. On the contrary, governments that use mass ethnic
violence face opportunity costs in terms of other policies that might better
achieve the state’s territorial objectives. For example, the troops or militia that
would be used to remove suspicious ethnic groups could instead be used in
ªghting the enemy state. The resources that could be used to relocate groups
could be used to provide new equipment and logistical support for troops on
the front lines. Additionally, targeting an entire ethnic group incurs costs that
could inºuence the outcome of the war. These costs include the loss of man-
power if members of the targeted group serve in the army or rebellion among
would-be deportees.
Given the availability of alternative policies and the uncertainty regarding
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through the lens of two-level games. See Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–460. This arti-
cle suggests that the variation depends on the organized cleavages that deªne the society and the
state’s leadership.
23. “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Causes and Conduct of the Bal-
kan Wars,” in George F. Kennan, ed., The Other Balkan Wars: 1913 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace; Brookings Institution Publications, 1993).
24. Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, “Targeting Civilians to Win? Assessing
the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization in Interstate War,” in Erica Chenoweth and
Adria Lawrence, eds., Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conºict (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2010), pp. 23–56.
the military effectiveness of ethnic cleansing, even members of the leadership
who prioritize territorial goals might reasonably disagree on whether the
wholesale targeting of ethnic groups is the most efªcient way of achieving
such goals. Again, one can imagine a continuum among state leaders who pri-
oritize territorial objectives. At one end are those who believe that ethnic
cleansing is the best way to accomplish these goals; at the other end are those
who think that the opportunity costs and uncertainty of the outcome make
ethnic cleansing an impractical policy. Those closer to this end of the spectrum
are more likely to endorse alternative means to achieving territorial goals, such
as strengthening the army or using limited deportations.
Sources of Disagreement within the Leadership
This section argues that the main factor that generates different perspectives
within a state’s leadership on whether to pursue ethnic cleansing against a
minority group in wartime is the existence of organized ideological alterna-
tives to nationalism based on non-ethnic cleavages such as socioeconomic
or clerical-anticlerical divisions. The idea that alternative cleavages have the
potential to reduce conºict on a given cleavage dimension is not new.25 Many
studies suggest that the existence of salient non-ethnic cleavages can mitigate
the intensity of ethnic conºict.26 I apply this long-standing theoretical insight
to the study of ethnic cleansing by specifying how these ideological alternatives
prevent the creation of radical policies against ethnic minorities in wartime.
To begin, consider country A, which has two political divisions: one nation-
alist and one nonnationalist. The nationalists want to retain and, if possible,
expand the territory of the state, as well as ensure the dominance of their eth-
nic group in the country. The nonnationalists are a product of social-class or re-
ligious-secular divisions.27 Class-based political groups might be represented
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25. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1959), p. 88; Michael Taylor and Douglas Rae, “An Analysis of Crosscutting between Political
Cleavages,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4 (April 1969), pp. 534–547; and Robert A. Dahl, A Pref-
ace to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
26. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1977); Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspec-
tives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 235–252; Thad Dunning and Lauren Harrison, “Cross-
Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali,” American Po-
litical Science Review, Vol. 104, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 21–39; and Joshua R. Gubler and Joel
Sawat Selway, “Horizontal Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages, and Civil War,” Journal of Conºict
Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 206–232.
27. Although the emphasis here is on leadership disagreements resulting from broad societal
cleavages, it is conceivable that elite-level disagreements that are based on generational or educa-
tional differences might play a comparable role. For example, it is possible that leaders with a cer-
tain generational or educational background are more or less likely to respect international norms
that pertain to human rights.
by socialist parties seeking economic redistribution and conservative parties
opposed to such policies. Secular groups might be represented by parties
seeking to end the traditional privileges of religious organizations, whereas
religious/clerical parties want to preserve these privileges. The members of
the leadership in country A vary in the extent to which they consider the na-
tionalist or the economic/religious objectives a priority. Therefore, one can
imagine a continuum with those focused only on nationalist objectives at one
end and those focused only on economic/religious objectives at the other.
Now assume that country A becomes the target of an annexationist war by a
neighboring state and that this neighboring state forms an alliance with mem-
bers of a minority ethnic group located in country A. In this situation, the
greater the relative importance of the nonnationalist dimension, the more ro-
bust are the obstacles against ethnic cleansing, for two reasons. (See ªgure 1
for the summary of the argument presented here.) First, those closer to the
nonnationalist side of the continuum might be more willing to offer territorial
concessions to end the war and redirect the resources that would have been
spent on it to pursue other goals. For socialist parties, these goals might in-
clude restructuring the economy; for anti-clerical groups, they might include
dismantling the organizational links between the state and religious institu-
tions. By implication, compared to nationalist groups, these factions would be
more reluctant to invest in the war effort, regardless of whether the investment
involves mass ethnic violence or other attempts to boost that effort.
Second, those closest to the nationalist end of the political spectrum might
evaluate the information regarding wartime security differently from those
further from it.28 Extreme nationalists are prone to viewing the world as di-
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28. For a relevant discussion on how ideologies might inºuence decisionmaking under uncer-
Figure 1. Domestic Political Structure and the Treatment of Minorities during Wars
vided into competing ethnic groups. Consequently, they might consciously or
subconsciously give credence to evidence that supports the existence or strate-
gic relevance of minority collaboration during wars, while ignoring informa-
tion to the contrary. They also might be more inclined to consider ethnic
minorities a long-term threat, and hence pursue policies that target the entire
group rather than selected subgroups that collaborate with the enemy. In con-
trast, those further from the nationalist end of the spectrum would be more
likely to consider evidence that raises doubts about the extent of minority col-
laboration or its strategic relevance for the outcome of the war. They would
also be more likely to view the minority as a potential future political partner
rather than a long-term threat.
The factions closer to the nonnationalist end of the spectrum can try to block
an ethnic cleansing campaign in two ways. First, if they dominate in the gov-
ernment, they can control the political agenda and obstruct political groups
that endorse policies targeting minority groups. Second, if they do not control
the government, they can still raise questions about the effectiveness of ethnic
cleansing in wartime. For example, they can use institutional mechanisms
such as parliamentary sessions to question the existence or strategic impor-
tance of minority collaboration or to underline the opportunity costs of ethnic
cleansing.29 In this way, they might prevent the government from starting an
ethnic cleansing campaign or help to halt ongoing deportations and killings.
War, Minority Collaboration, and Divergent Outcomes
This section demonstrates that the Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian cases com-
pared in this article share three critical characteristics: the existence of a territo-
rial dispute between neighboring states, a connection between this dispute
and an ethnic minority in the contested region, and a war between the states
during which some members of the minority collaborated with the enemy
state. (See table 1 for a summary of the criteria involved in the case selection.)
italians in austria
Historically, the Italians in Austria primarily lived in two regions; the Alpine
regions bordering Italy (Trentino and South Tyrol) and the Austrian Littoral
(Trieste, Gorizia, Gradiska, Istria, and Dalmatia).30 After the uniªcation of Italy
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tainty, see Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North, “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Insti-
tutions,” Kyklos, Vol. 47, No. 1 (February 1994), pp. 3–31.
29. This argument does not presume the existence of a particular form of government. As the fol-
lowing sections show, the institutional mechanisms discussed here could exist even in contexts in
which the main executive authority was not elected, and therefore the regime was not democratic.
30. The total number of Austrian Italians was around 760,000. In Trentino, the Italian speakers
in 1861, control of these territories became a topic of dispute between Italy and
Austria-Hungary. At the time, there was a strong movement within Italy to
annex the Austrian territories with Italian populations. Through its consular
services, the Italian government established organizations in Austria, such
as Pro-Patria and Lega Italia, to promote the Italian language.31 In addi-
tion, several high-level politicians and government ofªcials in Italy were mem-
bers of the Dante Alighieri Association, which offered ªnancial support to
Italian schools and electoral campaign subsidies to irredentist Italian parties
in Austria.32
Italy made explicit territorial demands to the Austro-Hungarian govern-
ment on two occasions. In 1908, it demanded territorial compensation in ex-
change for supporting Austria’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then,
after the Austrian army experienced serious losses on the eastern front in 1914
during World War I, Italy demanded the Alpine and Littoral territories as
the price for its neutrality in the war.33 In response, Austria offered to cede
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were the majority; in South Tyrol and the Littoral, the majorities were German and Slavic speakers,
respectively.
31. Kent R. Greenªeld, “The Italian Nationality Problem of the Austrian Empire,” Austrian History
Year Book, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1967), pp. 491–526.
32. Luciano Monzali, The Italians of Dalmatia: From Italian Uniªcation to World War I (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 150–182.
33. Ibid., p. 304; and Leo Valiani, “Italian-Austro-Hungarian Negotiations, 1914–1915,” Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July 1966), pp. 113–136.
Table 1. Similar Wartime Security Conditions but Divergent Outcomes in Multinational
Empires during World War I
Austro-Hungarian
Empire and
Italians
Ottoman
Empire and
Armenians
Russian Empire
and Muslims in
South Caucasus
Factors
controlled
prewar link between
interstate territorial
dispute and minority
group
yes yes yes
involvement in
multifront war
yes yes yes
minority collaboration
with enemy state
during war
yes yes yes
Divergent
outcome
treatment of
minorities during war
temporary and
limited relocation
from war-zone
areas, no
massacres
ethnic
cleansing
and
genocide
localized
massacres,
plans for mass
deportation that
do not
materialize
Trentino to Italy after the war. But because the Allies promised more territory
to Italy than did Austria, Italy entered the war against Austro-Hungary in
May 1915.34
During the war , Trentino, South Tyrol, and the areas along the Isonzo River
close to the Adriatic became front lines between Italy and Austria. In 1915 and
1916, the Austrian armies defended the border against numerous Italian offen-
sives. Despite a limited Italian push into Austrian territory in 1916, the front
remained relatively static until 1917, after which the Austrians defeated
the Italians with the help of German troops. In the spring of 1918, the German
armies aiding the Austrian troops were pulled from the Austro-Italian front
line, leaving the Austrian troops in a relatively weak position compared to
the Italians backed by their allies. In November 1918, Austria lost the areas
with Italian-speaking populations in the Alpine regions and Austrian Littoral.
Throughout the war, ethnic Italians in Austria maintained a relationship
with the Italian government.35 Even before Italy entered the war, around 3,000
Austrian Italians had joined the Italian army.36 Once the war started, this num-
ber increased signiªcantly and included leading Italian members of the
Austrian parliament and the Tyrolean Regional Diet.37 In addition, there were
reports of desertions and draft avoidance among Austrian Italians, a trend that
was relatively common among Italian farmers.38
At no time, however, did Austria engage in a policy of ethnic cleansing
against its Italian minority. Rather, it temporarily evacuated Italians from war-
zone areas in the Alpine and Littoral territories. The evidence suggests that
these evacuations were mandatory in areas on the front lines but voluntary in
those merely close to the battle zones.39 The Austrian authorities relocated
around 114,000 Italians from Trentino, South Tyrol, and the areas close to the
Isonzo River after Italy entered the war.40 These individuals were sent to refu-
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gee camps across the empire and, with the exception of around 12,000 Italians
who were deemed dangerous and taken to internment camps, were allowed
freedom of movement.41
armenians in the ottoman empire
The Armenians of the Ottoman Empire primarily lived in the six eastern prov-
inces of Anatolia, but signiªcant numbers could also be found in the central re-
gions and in western cities, including Istanbul.42 Like the Alpine and Littoral
regions in Austria, parts of Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus had been the
objects of territorial conºict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire through-
out the nineteenth century.
In the early twentieth century, the link between the Armenian population of
the Ottoman Empire and Russian territorial claims was weaker than the link
between the Italian claims on Austrian territory and the Austrian Italians.
Russia based its plans for Eastern Anatolia on relatively ºuid imperialist goals
rather than irredentist ones. As a result, unlike Italy, which had explicit claims
only to territories inhabited by Austrian Italians, Russia’s territorial plans did
not depend on the presence of Armenians in a given area.43 In addition, unlike
Italy, which entered World War I speciªcally to annex the Italian-speaking
areas in Austria, the Russians considered the front with the Ottomans a dis-
traction from their conºict with the German and Austro-Hungarian armies.44
Nevertheless, on the eve of World War I, the Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire became entangled in the territorial competition between the two
empires in two ways. First, in 1914 the great powers, including Russia, pres-
sured Ottoman leaders to agree to a set of reforms that would increase the au-
tonomy of the Christian population of Eastern Anatolia and allow foreign
inspectors to oversee progress of the reforms. Thus, the Christian population
of Eastern Anatolia, composed primarily of Armenians, became linked to for-
eign intervention.45 Second, because the main Armenian political parties (the
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Dashnak and Hinchak Organizations) operated in both Russian and Ottoman
territories, Russian Armenians, who tended to be more dominant in these or-
ganizations, could exert inºuence on their co-ethnics in the Ottoman territory.
In late 1914, the Ottoman leadership asked Ottoman Armenian leaders to orga-
nize their Russian counterparts to rebel against Russia.46 The Armenian lead-
ers refrained from making this commitment, but agreed to cooperate with the
Ottoman leaders by endorsing the conscription of Armenians into the Otto-
man army.47 The Russian leadership was more successful, however, in enlist-
ing the support of the Russian Armenians in seeking volunteers among the
Ottoman Armenians.48
The Ottoman Empire entered World War I in November 1914. In the early
stages, the Ottomans captured parts of Ardahan Province, which had been lost
to Russia in 1878. After these modest successes, they conducted an offensive in
December 1915, with the ultimate goal of recovering the provinces of Kars and
Batum. During this campaign, the Ottoman army experienced a crushing de-
feat at the Battle of Sarikamis, exposing Eastern Anatolia to Russian invasion.49
The Russian army started to move into Ottoman territory beginning in the
spring of 1915, recovering Ardahan and capturing several other Ottoman
provinces in Eastern Anatolia.
Like those of the Austrian Italians, the Ottoman Armenians’ loyalties were
divided during the war. The majority of Armenian men of military age
were recruited as soldiers into the Ottoman army with the cooperation of
the Armenian leadership.50 At the same time, from the beginning some
Ottoman Armenians volunteered for units organized by the Russian army and
fought against Ottoman forces, including in the Battle of Sarikamis.51 During
the war, Ottoman Armenians occasionally revolted against government efforts
at military recruitment and engaged in isolated attempts at sabotage in areas
in which they lived.52
The Ottoman leadership started its ethnic cleansing campaign targeting
the Ottoman Armenians in March 1915. Initially, the main targets were the
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Armenian populations in areas considered strategically important or prone
to revolt. In late April, these policies were broadened to include the en-
tire Armenian population of not only Eastern but also Central Anatolia, far
from the front lines. In the same period, the government rounded up and de-
ported the political and intellectual leaders of the Armenian community in
Istanbul. At this stage, an organization under the control of the ministry of
interior, the Special Organization (Teskilat-i Mahsusa), began conducting
large-scale killings of Armenians who were in the process of being deported.
By the fall of 1915, the Armenian populations of Eastern and Central Anatolia
were on the brink of annihilation.
muslims in the russian south caucasus
At the end of the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish war, Russia incorporated into its terri-
tory the three provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which until then had
been under Ottoman control. These provinces contained signiªcant Muslim
populations, including Turks, Kurds, and Georgian-speaking Ajars and Lazi.53
In the broader region of the South Caucasus lived other Muslim populations,
including the Abkhazians and Circassians.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslim populations in the prov-
inces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum became entangled in the territorial compe-
tition between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. One of the goals of the
Ottoman leaders before and during World War I was to regain control of
the three provinces. Although the Ottoman leadership generally expressed
this ambition in imperialistic rather than irredentist terms, its more national-
istic members wanted to expand the empire’s borders to include the Turkic-
speaking populations of Central Asia.
To fulªll their territorial goals, Ottoman leaders recruited the Muslim
populations in the South Caucasus for espionage missions and provided assis-
tance to those seeking to organize resistance to Russian rule. Both policies
were carried out by intelligence units of the Ottoman consulates in the con-
tested region, as well as by former Russian subjects with local contacts, such
as Ajars who had migrated to the Ottoman Empire after the Russian annex-
ation of the three provinces and Circassians who had been deported to
the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s.54 After the formation of the Special
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Organization by Ismail Enver Pasha in November 1913, the Ottoman policy in
the region focused on recruiting volunteer units that could be used in the
event of a war.55As a result, in late 1914, irregular military units composed of
Ajari and Laz volunteers from Russian areas, thought to number around 5,000,
fought alongside Ottoman forces in battles that resulted in the takeover of
parts of Ardahan.56
After recapturing parts of Ardahan from Ottoman forces, Russian army
units engaged in targeted massacres of the Ajars and Lazi.57 In addition, politi-
cal ªgures in the Kars, Ardahan, and Batum Provinces sought to deport their
entire Muslim populations to inner Russia. Such plans for a full-scale ethnic
cleansing campaign initially found backing in the national government but, for
reasons discussed below, ultimately failed.
Domestic Political Structures and Wartime Minority Policies
This section examines the differences among the domestic political structures
of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires and shows how
these differences relate to the presence or absence of wartime ethnic cleansing
against minorities.
austria: domestic politics and the absence of ethnic cleansing
Before World War I, Austro-Hungary was a multinational empire comprising
two entities, one Austrian and the other Hungarian.58 These two entities were
politically independent of each other except for their shared ministries of war,
ªnance, and foreign affairs. In Austria, the Germans were the largest and polit-
ically dominant group.59 Austria operated as a constitutional monarchy in
which the parliament passed laws that the emperor either accepted or rejected.
The Austrian parliament was bicameral; the Upper House comprised
unelected nobility and clergy, while the Lower House comprised repre-
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sentatives elected through limited suffrage until 1907 and universal male suf-
frage thereafter.
The Austrian-German leadership contained four main ideological
blocs.60 The Pan-German bloc consisted of radical nationalists who prioritized
territorial goals and viewed minority groups with suspicion. Members of this
group advocated the complete dominance of the German language across the
empire and eventual uniªcation with Germany. The peak of their support
came in 1901, when they sent twenty-one deputies to the parliament, but they
lost most of these seats after the 1907 introduction of universal male suffrage.61
A group of Pan-Germans then formed the Austrian National Socialist Party,
which tried but failed to break the inºuence of the Social Democrats among
German workers.62
The second bloc, the Liberals, had an anti-clerical, capitalist, and mildly na-
tionalist agenda. When in government during 1867–80, they passed various
pieces of anti-clerical legislation and advocated the dominance of the German
language in a more centralized Austria.
The third bloc, the Conservatives, was supported by the nobility, high clergy,
and peasant followers of these groups from various ethnicities. Members of
this bloc advocated extensive provincial autonomy and clerical dominance in
education. A coalition of Conservatives and minority representatives, labeled
the “Iron Ring,” formed the backbone of Austrian governments in the 1880–93
period and passed laws that extended linguistic rights to Austria’s minority
groups. On the eve of the 1907 elections, the Conservatives united with the
Christian Social Party, which had a clerical, anti-Semitic agenda and was pop-
ular among the Germans in Vienna. After uniªcation, the Christian Democrats,
now including the Conservatives, emerged as the largest group in the parlia-
ment in the 1907 elections.63
The fourth bloc comprised the Social Democrats, who focused primarily on
socioeconomic issues and occasionally cooperated with minority nationalist
parties. Like the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats strongly beneªted
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from the introduction of universal suffrage and in 1911 emerged as the largest
party in the Austrian parliament.64
Austria’s domestic politics during World War I can be divided into two peri-
ods. From 1914 until of the death of Emperor Franz Joseph in November 1916,
the government prorogued the parliament and extended the military’s powers
over civilians. After November 1916, the military began losing its extended
powers and the parliament started to function again. In both periods, divisions
within the leadership helped avert the creation of a policy of ethnic cleansing
against the Italians.
Austria’s wartime government was dominated by nobles who had served
as governors or members of previous Conservative-Catholic governments. The
government agreed on a combative policy toward Serbia, but took a less ag-
gressive approach toward Italy that included territorial compromise. Before
Italy declared war against Austria in May 1915, the Austrian government con-
ducted lengthy negotiations with the Italians in an effort to persuade them
against entering the war. During these talks, many members of the Austrian
government supported plans to concede territory to Italy in return for its
neutrality.65 As noted earlier, the negotiations failed when the Allies prom-
ised more territory to Italy. Nevertheless, the talks show that within the
Conservative government, territorial concessions were considered poten-
tially acceptable.
Once Italy entered the war, the Austrian military leadership made two de-
mands. First, it wanted emergency powers over all areas close to the front
lines, including the Alpine territories. Second, it wanted the thousands of
Italian citizens who had come to Austro-Hungary as guest workers before the
war to be put into internment camps.66 Under Count Sturgkh, the government
agreed to allow military trials of some civilians, including Italians, and to es-
tablish military rule in Galicia, which was under imminent Russian threat. It
also launched a program of forced and voluntary relocation of populations
from areas on or close to the front lines. Beyond these policies, however, the
high command’s repeated requests to impose emergency measures in regions
such as the Alpine territories were refused by the emperor on the advice of
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the government.67 Similarly, the emperor rejected the military’s push to incar-
cerate all Italian citizens living in Austria.68
Ideological discord among Austria’s political parties became particularly
prominent after the death of Franz Joseph. Following the suspension of the
parliament, the German Liberal and Nationalist parties passed a resolution
that outlined their political goals, such as closer relations with Germany.69
Their demands, however, were far too mild for the Pan-Germans, who pub-
lished a document calling for “such relations between Germans and other
races as shall permanently ensure and maintain the dominant political and
cultural position of the German race.”70 Whatever their demands, however,
the Pan-Germans remained a small minority even within the nationalist
German leadership.
Deeper political divisions prevailed between the Nationalists, on the one
hand, and the Social Democrats, Conservatives, and clericals, on the other. The
Social Democrats opposed the suspension of the parliament from the begin-
ning; and in the spring of 1916, their demands to reconvene the parliament be-
gan to gain momentum. They were also cautiously backed by the Christian
Democrats, uncomfortable with Liberal and Nationalist demands for closer re-
lations with the predominantly Protestant German Empire.71 Although the
government initially resisted the efforts of these groups to reconvene the par-
liament, two events resulted in a reversal. First, a paciªst Social Democratic
leader, Fredrick Adler, assassinated Prime Minister Count Sturgkh, who had
resisted efforts to allow the parliament to resume its activities. Second,
Austria’s new emperor, Charles I, did not share his predecessor’s antagonism
toward the parliament.72
When the parliament reconvened in May 1917, some of the earlier divisions
among the various ideological blocs started to inºuence wartime policy. For
example, as a reaction to the news of defections by ethnic-minority soldiers
on the front line, German Nationalists demanded harsh punishments and
stronger repressive measures.73 In collaboration with the minority groups in
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parliament, however, the Social Democrats passed measures to reverse mili-
tary decisions that had resulted in the arrest of many minority politicians, in-
cluding Italians, and restored judicial authority to the civilian courts.74
During the war, Austria’s Italian minority could have become the target of
an ethnic cleansing campaign under two counterfactual scenarios. Both were
averted as a result of divisions within the Austrian leadership. First, if the mili-
tary had succeeded in imposing martial law in Trentino, South Tyrol, and the
Littoral regions of Austria, it could have eventually conducted mass deporta-
tions and killings for reasons of military security or to avoid future territorial
demands by Italy. To implement this policy, the military could have relied on
the predominantly German local militia in South Tyrol, the Tyrolean Riºemen
Association, which had already signiªcantly increased its membership at the
beginning of the war.75 There were also members of the civilian government,
especially those with a military background such as War Minister Alexander
Krobatin, who advocated deporting ethnic Italians to Italy if not during, then
possibly after, the war.76 Ultimately, however, other ªgures in the civilian gov-
ernment, including the foreign minister, persuaded Franz Joseph to reject mar-
tial law in the Alpine and Littoral areas and hence curbed the potential for a
military-driven ethnic-cleansing campaign in these regions.77
In a second, more remote counterfactual, the Pan-Germans or a similar na-
tionalist party could have pushed for an ethnic-cleansing campaign once the
parliament reconvened in May 1917. Like the military, they may have wanted
to prevent future Italian territorial demands or to show displeasure with the
enlistment of thousands of Austrian Italians in the Italian army. This type of
policy might have become especially attractive for the Nationalists after it be-
came clear in early 1918 that Germany would no longer be able to aid Austrian
troops on the Italian front. Such a policy, however, was unlikely to materialize
for two reasons. First, the nationalist parties did not dominate Austrian poli-
tics. Second, during 1917–18, the Social Democrats, who were willing to end
the war and work with the minorities, including the Italians, were dominant
in the parliament.
ottoman empire: domestic politics and ethnic cleansing
With the exception of a short-lived parliamentary experience in 1877–78, the
Ottoman Empire remained an autocratic regime without any effective con-
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straints on the power of Sultan Abdulhamit II until 1908. From 1878 to 1908,
several groups sought to introduce a parliamentary system and curb the pow-
ers of the sultan. Among them were émigrés residing in European cities and a
group of young Ottoman ofªcers, who formed a secret organization known as
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In 1908 this organization started
a rebellion in Macedonia and forced Abdulhamit to sanction elections for a
new parliament.
After 1908, the Turkish leadership began to experience a degree of political
competition. On one side was the CUP, which favored a centralized politi-
cal system and sought to curtail the privileges of religious institutions, both
Muslim and Christian. On the other side was a coalition of liberals and reli-
gious elites bound by their preference for a more decentralized system that
would allow for religious and communal autonomy. By implication, this fac-
tion supported retention of the communal privileges of Christian minorities as
opposed to pursuing policies that sought to “Ottomanize” and secularize them
along with their Muslim counterparts.
The liberal-religious faction created two political parties. The Liberal Party,
established in September 1908, proved to be short-lived after becoming in-
volved in an unsuccessful coup attempt organized by religious ofªcers and
elites on April 13, 1909. Following the failure of the coup, the liberal group
formed the Freedom and Unity Party, in 1911. The party defeated the CUP in
the intermediary elections of 1911, but it performed poorly in the general elec-
tions of 1912. Nevertheless, the party was able to exert some inºuence on gov-
ernment policy through individuals who were not ofªcial members but were
sympathetic to its political agenda.
Whatever inºuence the liberal-religious elite had, however, was wiped out
during the First Balkan War (1912–13), which resulted in the loss of Macedonia
and Western Thrace to Greece. Enraged by these territorial losses, three leaders
from the radical nationalist faction of the CUP—Enver, Mehmed Talat, and
Ahmed Cemal—took control of the government in a coup d’état.78 The
Freedom and Unity Party dissolved, and many of its members as well as other
dissenting voices went into exile or were otherwise politically sidelined. The
triumvirate also removed potential opposition in the military and appointed
supporters to key domestic security positions.79 In the 1914 elections, just prior
to the start of the war, the CUP was the only party ªelding candidates.
The Ottoman Empire entered World War I under the leadership of the radi-
cal nationalist faction of the CUP, which was motivated by the prospect of cap-
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turing territories lost to Russia in the nineteenth century. Immediately after
entering the war, the group dissolved the Ottoman parliament, preemptively
silencing the remaining relatively moderate members within the CUP. Given
that the liberal opposition from outside the CUP had already been suppressed
before the war, the radical faction of the CUP encountered no effective oppo-
sition when making decisions regarding the fate of the minorities, including
the Armenians.
The period that resulted in the genocide of Ottoman Armenians can be
roughly divided into three stages.80 From the entry of the Ottoman Empire into
the war until the end of the Sarikamis offensive in January 1915, the CUP lead-
ership arrested members of selected Armenian organizations, primarily mem-
bers of the Hinchak Party. In the second stage, from the end of the Sarikamis
offensive until late April 1915, two developments occurred. First, the Ottoman
military started the systematic deportation and massacre of Armenians in ar-
eas considered to be strategically important to the war effort. At this point in
the war, the deported populations from the east and southeast of Anatolia
were sent to Central Anatolia. In addition, Armenian soldiers and ofªcers,
who until then had been serving in the Ottoman army, were transferred to la-
bor battalions. Meanwhile, the Armenians revolted in late March in the south-
eastern town of Zeitun and in mid-April in the eastern town of Van.
In the third stage, starting in May 1915, the CUP moved to a full-scale policy
of ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Armenians of Anatolia. The CUP
leadership issued a “deportation order” aimed at wartime opponents of the
government.81 Armenians who had been recruited into labor battalions were
systematically killed; the deportations were expanded to target all Armenians
of Central and Eastern Anatolia, including those not on the front lines. In ad-
dition, the government began directing the deportees to the Syrian desert
rather than to Central Anatolia.82
There are at least three counterfactual scenarios in which the Armenians of
Anatolia would not have been subjected to ethnic cleansing and genocide.83 In
the ªrst scenario, the radicals within the CUP could have failed to silence other
factions in their party or the state bureaucracy. Given the presence of promi-
nent individuals in the bureaucracy who disagreed with the triumvirate’s
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harsh policies against the Armenians, this counterfactual seems quite plausi-
ble. For example, Tahsin Bey, who had been the governor of Van until March
1915 and later served as the governor of Erzurum in July 1915, criticized
the Armenian policy of the triumvirate as follows: “Rather than deporting the
Armenians in the middle of a war, I suggest for my part that they be main-
tained in their present situation until further notice and not be spurred to re-
volt by the illegitimate use of force. . . . After enduring this painful experience
and its deadly consequences, we are, I fear, making the mistake of putting our
army in an untenable situation.”84
Tahsin Bey thus considered the deportations and massacres misguided not
only because they were morally reprehensible but also because they were
likely to hurt the war effort.85 If governors such as Tahsin Bey had enjoyed
some organizational backing in Istanbul, they might have been able to prevent
the policy from moving to the second or third stage. Even without organiza-
tional backing, if the CUP leadership had been unable to replace these gover-
nors, they might still have been able to prevent ethnic cleansing in the areas
under their charge. The CUP’s radical leadership, however, was able to re-
move the governors who resisted its Armenian policy.
In the second counterfactual scenario, the liberal opposition, as it existed
prior to 1914, could have remained intact during the war. The liberals had a
sustained history of working with Christian populations to curb the central-
izing policies of the CUP.86 Given this history, they might have been more will-
ing to believe evidence from the east, such as details offered by the former
governor of Van, that the Armenians were, generally speaking, compliant and
that an ethnic-cleansing campaign was unlikely to improve the security sit-
uation. Thus, if the Liberals had wielded inºuence in the government, the
Armenian policy might have never moved beyond the ªrst or second stage.
A third, more remote, counterfactual scenario is one in which political par-
ties such as the Social Democrats in Austro-Hungary, which wanted to stop the
war and focus on other issues, also existed in the Ottoman Empire. Especially
after the military defeat at Sarikamis, such political groups could have ceded
some territory to Russia and pulled out of the war. It is plausible that the
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Russians would have agreed to such a policy because Russia’s main focus was
its military front with the Germans; and until the Ottomans entered the war in
late 1914, Russia had favored Ottoman neutrality to avoid opening an addi-
tional front in the Caucasus. But given the absence in the Ottoman Empire
of parties similar to those of social democrats elsewhere, no such outcome
was likely.
russia: domestic politics and partial ethnic cleansing
Like the Ottoman Empire, the Russian political system lacked effective con-
straints on the decisionmaking ability of the monarch for much of the pre–
World War I period. The period from 1860 to 1905, however, also witnessed
important changes that were largely absent in the Ottoman Empire, such as the
establishment of semi-autonomous local peasant units, increasing industrial-
ization, and the emergence of an organized labor movement.87
In 1905, widespread strikes and peasant protests forced Czar Nicholas II to
declare the formation of the State Duma, whose members would be elected
through universal male suffrage. Four politically signiªcant factions, two on
the left and two on the right, emerged as a result. The ªrst was the Kadets, or
Constitutional Democrats, who represented the liberal left and were largely
supported by the urban educated strata and progressive nobles. The Kadets
advocated a constitutional monarchy and universal male suffrage and were
open to non-Russian members. The second included left-wing groups such as
the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party. These
parties were interested primarily in changing the political structure of the
empire and, in the case of the Bolsheviks, were adamantly against Russia’s en-
try into World War I.88 The left-wing parties and the Kadets dominated in the
ªrst two Dumas that served until June 1907, when an electoral law passed
restricting suffrage and minority representation, thus giving dominance to
right-wing parties.89
The right-wing parties included the Octobrists, which like the Kadets sup-
ported constitutional democracy but adhered to a more conservative economic
agenda, and the Conservative and Nationalist Parties, which advocated
Russian and aristocratic dominance throughout the empire. Some nationalist
subgroups, such as the Black Hundreds, held especially radical views toward
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minorities.90 Nevertheless, among the groups on the right it was the Octobrists
who enjoyed the largest representation in both the third and fourth Dumas,
which coincided with the war period. Thus, the radical nationalists, though
gaining ascendancy in the 1907–14 period, were not a dominant political force.
The Russian Empire entered World War I under the leadership of a conser-
vative government dominated by monarchists who earlier had served as civil
servants. Seeking national unity during wartime, the moderate nationalists
and Octobrists initially suspended the activities of the Duma in August 1914.
The opposition, however—including the left-wing parties and signiªcant sec-
tions of the Kadet Party—continued to convene regularly, if informally, to dis-
cuss the progress of the war.91
Dissatisªed with Russia’s war effort, the parliamentary groups demanded
the reopening of the Duma, which occurred in January 1915. Thereafter, the
parties in the Duma, including the Octobrists, become more critical of the con-
servatives in the cabinet. In the summer of 1915, the Duma-based opposition
increased its pressure on the government by demanding appointments to min-
isterial positions and asking for reforms that would extend the political rights
of Russia’s lower classes and minorities.92 Czar Nicholas acceded to replacing
most members of the cabinet but did not undertake political reforms. In
February 1917, growing protests resulted in the abdication of the czar and the
formation of a provisional government led by the parties in the Duma. In-
creasing competition between the Bolsheviks and the provisional government
eventually culminated in the October 1917 revolution.
Starting in February 1917, divisions similar to those between the right- and
left-wing political factions began to emerge in the army. The ªrst signs were
declarations of soldiers’ rights and rank-and-ªle resistance to punishment.
Then, after an unsuccessful military offensive against Austro-German posi-
tions in June 1917, the demands included the resignation of bourgeois min-
isters, the transfer of power to the Soviets, and a peace treaty ending the war. 93
At times, the regular soldiers were joined by lower-ranking ofªcers, but not
higher-ranking ones, who typically came from nobility. By September 1917,
these divisions had resulted in the collapse of the Russian army, including the
army of the Caucasus, which had been ªghting against the Ottomans.94
Once again, it is useful to consider counterfactual scenarios that could have
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resulted in ethnic cleansing against the Muslims in the South Caucasus. Be-
cause the revolutionary situation in Russia beginning in 1917 increasingly dis-
tracted the leadership from the war effort, I focus on two scenarios that relate
to the 1914–16 period. In the ªrst counterfactual, the Russian military could
have turned to ethnic cleansing during the initial stages of the war in late 1914,
when Ottoman troops annexed areas around Ardahan. This period could have
witnessed ethnic cleansing not only because Ottoman forces were annexing
Russian territory, but also because they were aided by volunteer units made
up of Russian Muslims from the territory under Ottoman threat. Despite mi-
nority collaboration and the Ottoman threat, however, the Russian leadership
did not resort to ethnic cleansing.
The second period during which the Russians could have turned to ethnic
cleansing was after the Sarikamis offensive. During this period, the immediate
security threat was mitigated as a result of the defeat of the Ottoman army, al-
though the ªghting was expected to continue. The Russian authorities at the
local and national levels indeed came close to implementing an ethnic cleans-
ing policy. Once the Russian army recovered Kars, Ardahan, and Batum,
Russian units conducted massacres against the Muslim population of the re-
gion of Artvin, who were suspected of collaboration with Ottoman forces.95 In
addition, the viceroy to the three provinces asked the council of ministers to
withdraw the citizenship of Muslims living in the three provinces and deport
them ªrst to the Russian interior and then to Ottoman territory at the end
of the war.96 With the backing of the council, provincial authorities launched
the wholesale deportation of the Muslim population.
These deportations were stopped in their early stages because, unlike the
Ottoman political system, the Russian system retained organized groups
able to challenge such policies. The group in this case consisted of Social
Democratic deputies who represented Georgia in the Duma. These deputies
argued that the Muslim population in question, which included signiªcant
numbers of Georgian-speaking Ajars, did not constitute a threat to Russian
control of the region.97 In reaction, Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich, a gen-
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eral in the Russian army with roots in Georgia, presided over a committee that
investigated the deputies’ claim. Based on the conclusions of the investigation,
the government decided to halt the deportations of Muslims inhabiting the
three provinces.98 (Table 2 provides a summary of the evidence from the three
cases discussed in this section.)
Other Explanations for Absence or Presence of Ethnic Cleansing
This section examines two alternative explanations for why among the Austro-
Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires, only the Ottomans engaged in
ethnic cleansing and genocide. The ªrst explanation centers on the nature of
preexisting ethnic cleavages.99 The second considers whether the wartime
security problem in the Ottoman Empire was greater than in the other
two empires.
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Table 2. Non-ethnic Cleavages and Ethnic Cleansing in Multinational Empires during
World War I
Austro-Hungarian
Empire and
Italians
Ottoman
Empire and
Armenians
Russian Empire
and Muslims in
South Caucasus
Extent to which non-ethnic
cleavages play a role during
peacetime
highest lowest middle
Whether leaders from
organizations based on non-ethnic
cleavages control the government
or have the means to inºuence it
during war
yes no yes
Wartime policy against minority temporary and
limited relocation
from war-zone
areas
ethnic
cleansing
and
genocide
localized
massacres,
plans for mass
deportations that
do not
materialize
prewar ethnic dislike
One alternative explanation for the Armenian genocide can be found in the in-
tense dislike of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire. Scholars highlight two
factors that could have made ethnic dislike more intense in the Ottoman case:
ªrst, the existence of religious differences between the dominant and minority
ethnic groups and, second, the existence of previous instances of violence to-
ward the minority group in the decades prior to World War I.100
There are several reasons why these two factors are not sufªcient to account
for the existence or nonexistence of ethnic cleansing in the three cases under
review. Consider, ªrst, the Russian and Ottoman cases. In both cases, the dom-
inant ethnic group had a religious afªliation different from the minority
in question. Additionally, repression and violence were aspects of both
Russian and Ottoman minority policies in the prewar period. For the Ottoman
Armenians, the period up to 1908 under Abdulhamit was marked with repres-
sion and violence. From 1893 to 1896, the government had organized
Hamidiyye Units, which conducted a series of pogroms targeting the
Armenians in Eastern Anatolia.101 There were also anti-Armenian riots in
Adana during the attempted coup of 1909. In Russia, the government orga-
nized large-scale massacres and deportations that targeted the Muslim popula-
tions in the South Caucasus in the 1860s.102 After the takeover of the provinces
of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, Muslims were subject to milder forms of repres-
sion by the Russian government, resulting in the large-scale migration of
the Laz and Ajar populations to Ottoman territory.103 Moreover, while the
Muslims in Russia were almost completely excluded from mainstream na-
tional politics, the main Armenian and Turkish political organizations in the
Ottoman Empire cooperated with each other both before and after the reforms
of 1908.104
In the Austrian case, the evidence suggests that the dominance of politicians
who did not prioritize nationalist policies accounts for the absence of large-
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scale prewar violence, despite serious tensions between ethnic Italians and
Germans. For instance, in 1904 the Austrian government decided to open two
divisions in the German-speaking University of Innsbruck, in Tyrol, that
would provide education in Italian. Following this decision, German students,
accompanied by a town mob, organized widespread attacks on Italian stu-
dents and faculty.105 The riots ended only after government troops intervened.
This episode highlights the role of the government, not ethnic tolerance, in po-
tentially precluding large-scale violence.106
extent of the security challenges
Another alternative is that, in addition to confronting challenges similar to
those of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, including multifront
wars and wartime minority collaboration, the Ottoman Empire faced another
challenge: an even graver security situation. In particular, historians have ar-
gued that revolts, such as the one that occurred in Van in April 1915, diverted
Ottoman troops from the Russian front and hence played an important role in
the government’s decision to deport the Armenian population of Anatolia.107
This argument has several problems. First, the occurrence of sporadic re-
volts does not negate the central argument made in this article that, during
wartime, the decision on whether revolts or collaboration constitutes a threat
depends not only on the actions of the members of the minority, but also
on the type of state leaders who are assessing the security situation. In the
Ottoman case, there were reasons for suspecting that the widespread deporta-
tions and massacre of Armenians would not improve the security situation. In
fact, these policies had the potential to divert troops from the war effort and in-
cite further revolts. Indeed, scholars who argue that the Armenian revolts
threatened the Ottoman troops in the east note that once the deportations and
killings spread, localized uprisings turned into a general insurgency.108 Such
concerns, however, were ignored by the radical faction that controlled the gov-
erning Committee of Union and Progress.
Second, the argument that the Armenian revolts were sufªcient to incite
wholesale deportations and killings also ignores the question of why the CUP
did not pursue less aggressive policies toward the Armenians, such as relocat-
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ing them from towns and villages that had experienced signiªcant revolts.
Indeed, this seems to have been the policy until March–April 1915. Thereafter,
the policy expanded to include all Armenians in Central and Eastern Anatolia,
regardless of whether they lived close to the front lines or had organized a re-
volt. Thus, the evidence suggests that around this time the CUP leaders
stopped considering the Armenians a short-term, war-related threat and in-
stead considered them a general threat that would hinder their ability to hold
on to Central and Eastern Anatolia in the long run. Yet, the long-term
security threat related to the minority in question was not more acute in the
Ottoman case compared with that in the Austrian and Russian cases. Espe-
cially in the Austrian case, the very basis for Italy’s territorial claims was
the presence of ethnic Italians in Austria. Hence, the minority in question
would appear to have constituted a more potent long-term threat to the territo-
rial integrity of this country.
Conclusion
This article makes two contributions to the literature on mass ethnic violence.
First, it argues that the decision to adopt a policy of ethnic cleansing against a
minority group in wartime depends not only on the severity of the security
threat posed by the group but also on the structure of the state leadership.109
Even if the security threat from minority ethnic groups is comparable, leaders
might opt for different minority policies in wartime depending on how they
perceive it. Second, how leaders react to and interpret wartime threats from
minority groups depends largely on the extent to which political organizations
based on non-ethnic cleavages such as class or clerical-anticlerical divisions
play a salient role in society. Leaders who prioritize such cleavages are more
likely to make territorial concessions so that they can turn their attention to the
socioeconomic or cultural issues that matter to them. As such, they are also
less likely to support policies that require them to invest their time and re-
sources further to achieve territorial goals. In addition, the more that leaders
prioritize non-ethnic issues, the less likely they are to view the world as di-
vided into competing ethnic groups. Hence, they are also less likely to ignore
evidence that calls into question the existence or strategic relevance of minor-
ity collaboration and more likely to use means other than ethnic cleansing to
achieve territorial goals.
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The article evaluated these arguments by comparing the policies of three
multinational empires (Ottoman Turkey, Russia, and Austro-Hungary) vis-à-
vis three minority groups (Armenians, Muslims in the South Caucasus, and
Italians) during World War I. All three groups had links with neighboring
states that made claims on the territories in which they were located, and
some of their members collaborated with these states during the war. Yet,
the three governments opted for different wartime policies regarding these mi-
norities. In the Ottoman case, where political parties and factions prioritizing
non-ethnic cleavages were, comparatively speaking, weak until 1914 and non-
existent thereafter, the radical nationalist leaders were able to implement a
genocidal policy against ethnic Armenians. In the Russian case, where there
were more salient non-ethnic cleavages, regional- and national-level leaders
came very close to implementing the wholesale deportation of Muslims in the
South Caucasus. Social Democratic deputies from the South Caucasus, how-
ever, successfully challenged the security rationale behind the deportation de-
cision. Finally, in the Austrian case, actors who could have favored radical
policies against the Italians, such as the Pan-Germans or elements within the
military, lacked sufªcient government control to implement a policy of full-
scale deportation or genocide.
To what extent are these ªndings applicable to other cases? Recent political
science literature provides evidence compatible with the argument of this arti-
cle. In his 2015 study of the causes of genocide in sub-Saharan Africa, Scott
Straus ªnds that non-ethnic cleavages were an important obstacle against
genocidal policies in high-risk civil wars in the early 2000s.110 For example,
during the civil war in Ivory Coast, non-ethnic cleavages that divided
Christian southerners and connected them to Muslim northerners made a
genocidal policy against the northern Muslim communities unlikely.111 Simi-
larly, in Mali “cousinage ties” or “joking alliances” between clans and ethnic
groups allowed for dialogue and helped avoid an outcome that could have re-
sembled the Rwandan genocide.112
The ªndings also provide a fresh perspective on the cases of ethnic cleansing
following the end of communism in the Soviet Union. The argument in this ar-
ticle suggests that the elimination of class and other non-ethnic cleavages
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in communist contexts made ethnic cleansing a likely outcome when wars
occurred. For example, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the absence of sa-
lient class cleavages contributed to the ethnic cleansing campaign of 1992–95
in two ways. First, in the initial free elections in 1990, the lack of signiªcant
non-ethnic cleavages that could rival ethnicity contributed to the failure of the
political parties that sought to emphasize economic rather than ethnic issues.
Second, given their inability to access power, parties with non-ethnic agendas
were also unable to prevent nationalist leaders from starting a civil war and
rapidly converging on ethnic cleansing as a war strategy.113
Are there policies that might promote the types of domestic conditions that,
according to this article, can prevent ethnic cleansing? On the one hand,
whether or not non-ethnic cleavages and, eventually, nonnationalist parties be-
come inºuential in a state’s political system is at least partially a function of
long-term historical processes such as state formation and economic modern-
ization.114 From this perspective, formulating and implementing policies that
generate domestic conditions that prevent ethnic cleansing would be ex-
tremely difªcult.
On the other hand, the ªndings have implications for the debate on whether
and how democratic institutions might inhibit mass ethnic violence. One view
is that democratic countries are less likely to engage in mass killings because
they impose institutional constraints on the leader.115 Another view, however,
is that democracies are more likely to engage in mass ethnic violence because
they empower majority ethnic groups or generate electoral incentives to incite
ethnic conºict.116
This article agrees with the ªrst view that institutional arrangements that al-
low for competition among multiple political parties, even when they do not
fulªll all the procedural requirements for democracy, could decrease the likeli-
hood of ethnic cleansing. The argument suggests that whether a competitive
institutional system can help avoid ethnic cleansing depends on the existence
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of inºuential parties that prioritize issues other than ethnicity. From this per-
spective, establishing competitive political systems in conºict-prone regions
could contribute to the prevention of mass ethnic violence to the extent that
such institutions lead to the emergence and empowerment of political parties
that emphasize non-ethnic issues.
This theoretical intuition also generates some expectations about the future
of countries such as Bosnia and Iraq. It suggests that Bosnia’s complicated con-
sociational democracy, designed to assuage ethnic conºict, is unlikely to pre-
vent ethnic cleansing if warlike conditions that resemble those of the early
1990s were to emerge in the future. At the same time, the modest electoral suc-
cess of parties with non-ethnic agendas in the 2010 election, if repeated, could
pose a serious barrier to political groups that might desire to use ethnic cleans-
ing in the future.117 By contrast, in Iraq, where political organizations that fo-
cus on non-ethnic issues, such as secular or left-wing parties, have become
increasingly marginalized, there remains almost no domestic barrier against
groups that could target minorities with an ethnic-cleansing campaign during
international or civil wars.
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